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PLAYERS’ INFORMATION IN TWO-PLAYER GAMES OF
“SCORE SHOWDOWN”
(MINORU SAKAGUCHI) *
ABSTRACT. There are some games widely played in the routine world of gambles, roulette, quiz
show and sports excersizes. The object of the games is to get the highest score among the play 1,
$\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}$ one or $w\mathrm{o}$ dhances of sampling. $\mathrm{e}$ two-player games of “Keep-or-Exchange” and “Riffi
Exchange” , where three types of information are provided to the players, are investigated The
results are compared and some open problems in this area are mentioned.
1 Two-player Game of “Score Showdown”.
Consider the two players I and $\mathrm{n}$ (sometimes they are denoted by 1 and 2, respectively). Let
$Xj(\mathrm{Y}_{j})$ be the random variable observed by I (II) at the 3-th observation, $j=1,2$. We assume
that $X_{1}$ , $X_{2},\mathrm{Y}_{1},\mathrm{Y}_{2}$ are $i.i.d$. each with unifo $\mathrm{m}$ distribution in $[0, 1]\mathrm{t}$
The game is played as follows. I $\mathfrak{M}$ $0$ serves $X_{1}=x$ $[\mathrm{Y}_{1}=y]$ and chooses one of eith er A
($i.e.$ , accepts the observed value) or $\mathrm{R}(i.\mathrm{e}.$ , rejects his observed due and samples a new random
variable).






rejected and $X_{2}$ is sampled,
and the score $S_{2}$ ($\mathrm{Y}_{1}$ ,Y2) for $\mathrm{n}$, is defined $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}[\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$, with $X_{i}\mathrm{s}$ replaced $\mathrm{W}\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{S}$ .
We call the game of $‘ {}^{t}\mathrm{K}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\succ \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ -Exchange”, “Risky Ex&ange’’ and “Showcase showdown” , when
$\varphi(X_{1},X_{2})=\mathrm{X}2\mathrm{i}\mathrm{X}2\mathrm{I}(\mathrm{X}2>X_{1})$ , and $(\dot{\mathrm{x}}_{1}+X_{2})I(X_{1}+X_{2}\leq 1)$,
respectively. Here $X(e)$ is the indicator of the event $\epsilon$ . For simpEcity, we denote these games GKE,
GRE and GSS, respectively. The name of GSS comes from Ref.[l].
After each player chooses his (or her) $\mathrm{R}$ or $\mathrm{A}$ , showdown is made, the scores are compared,
and the player with the higher score than the opponent becomes the winner. Each player $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\dot{\mathrm{i}}M$ to
maximize the probab iEty of his (or her) winning.
We consider the three information types, under which the players decide their choices of either
$\mathrm{R}$ or A.
$\mathrm{I}^{10-01}$ means that I olmrves $X_{1}=x$ , $\mathrm{n}$ observes $\mathrm{Y}_{1}=y$ , and each player doesn’t inform his
observed value to his opponent.
$\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$ means that I observes $\mathrm{x}_{1}=x$ , II observes $\mathrm{Y}_{1}=y$ , and each player informs his observed
value to his opponent.
$\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$ means that I obser es $X_{1}=x$ , $\Pi$ observes $\mathrm{Y}_{1}=y$, and I informs his $X_{1}=x$ to $\mathrm{n}$ , but IF
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doesn’t inform his $\mathrm{Y}_{1}=y$ to $\mathrm{L}$
The GKEs (GREs) under these three information types are solved in Sections 2, 3 and 4 (Sections
5,6 and 7). The most important difference etvveen GKE and GRE is that “draw” occurs with
positive probability in the latter, but it doesn’t occur in the former.
In Section 9 we discuss the games GKE and GRE under information $\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$ , in which the $” \mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}arrow$
mover” I adopts some randomization in his strategy in order to restore his disadvantage. The
results in Theorem 1\sim 6, $3\mathrm{E}$ and $6\mathrm{B}$ are compared in Sections 8 and 9. Some open probrems in this
area are mentioned in the final Section 10,
$\mathrm{g}$. $\sigma-_{4\mathrm{K}\backslash 4}$. $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{f}$ $;_{/}\mathrm{K}_{v\mathfrak{q}arrow \mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}Y-}\underline{\mathrm{F}}*a@_{r^{I_{1}}}\iota\iota n\mathrm{t}_{4^{l}\backslash dSr}$ I $(\Re_{\triangleright})$
$3$. $\epsilon_{14n’ e}\mathit{0}$ \dagger $t_{r}\kappa_{ae\mathrm{a}}P^{-\triangleright_{\ddot{l}}\sim}.\in_{\mathrm{X}\iota}\mathrm{A}_{l\hslash}g\cdot e$ ’
$l_{\{t[\mathit{4}p}$ , I $l\mathrm{I}-ll$ $(|\S\S)$
$\not\simeq$. $\varphi_{\mathrm{Q}\iota\eta\{}\iota \mathrm{f}$ $\mathrm{t}_{t}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{P}^{-l}‘\backslash \mathrm{Y}$
$-\in\tau d_{lI}\eta\partial^{4^{\mathrm{I}}}4$ ,$\mathrm{f}1l\{\not\in$’ \ddagger $(|\mathrm{a}_{\triangleright \mathrm{t}}\mathrm{x}$





6 Game of “Risky Exchange” under $\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$
Define state $(x,y)$ as the same as in Section 3. Let pAR(x, $y$) $[q.\mathit{4}R(x,y)]$ denote the winning
probability for I [$\prod$ when the players’ choices are A by I and $\mathrm{R}$ by II in state $(x, y)$ . Other
three probabilities $pRA(x, y)$ $[qRA(x,y)]$ $eie$ are defined similarly. Also let $h_{RA}(x, y)$ etc denote
the probability of draw, similarly. Hereier, we shall sometimes omit the state description, for
simplicity. We evidently have, for $\forall(x,y)$ ,
(6.1) $p_{AA}+q_{AA}+h_{AA}=1$
and other three equations, and
(6.2) hy $=hAR=h_{RA}=0$ , $h_{RB}$ $=P(X_{2}<x, \mathrm{Y}_{2}<y)=xy$ .
Furthermore we find that
(6.3) $PAA$ $=$ $I(x, y)$ ,
(6.2) PAR $=$ $P[\{y<\mathrm{Y}_{2}<x\}\cup\{\mathrm{Y}_{2}<y\}]=(x -y)I(x>y)+y$,
(6.3) $PRA$ $=$ $P\{X_{2}>x, X_{2}>y\}=1-x\vee y$ ,
(6.6) $p_{RR}$ $=$ $P[(X_{2}>x)\cap\{(X_{2}>\mathrm{Y}_{2}>y)\cup(\mathrm{Y}_{2}<y)\}]$
$=$ $\frac{1}{2}(1+y^{2})-xxy$ $- \frac{1}{2}(x -y)^{2}I(x>y)$ .
Therefore, from Eqs (6.1)\sim (6.6), players in state $(x,y)$ face the bimatrix game with the payoff
bimatrix
$\mathrm{R}$ A
(6.7) $\mathrm{M}(x,y)=\mathrm{R}$ $PRR$ , $1-xy-p_{RR}$ $1-x\vee.y$ , $x\mathrm{V}y$
A $(x -y)I(x >y)+y$ , $\overline{y}-(x-y)I(x>y)$ $I\langle x>y)$ , $I(x<y)$




$\frac{1}{2}(1+y^{2})-xy$, $\frac{1}{B}(1-y^{2})$ $\overline{y}$ ,
$y(\equiv \mathrm{M}(x,y|x\leq y)$ , say) if $x\leq y$ ;
$y$ , $\overline{y}$ 0, 1






Theorem 5 Solution to GRE under $\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$ , in state (x, y), is as follows ;
Case Eq. strategy-pair Eq, val.M(s, y)
$y>x$ $\vee(\sqrt{2}-1)$ saddle $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}$. R-A $y-$ , $y$
$x<y<\sqrt{2}-1$ R-R $\mathrm{z}^{(1+y^{2})-xy}1,$ $\mathrm{z}^{(1-y^{2})}1$
$y<x<\sqrt{2}-1$ R-R $\frac{1}{2}(1-x^{2})$ , $\frac{1}{2}(1+x^{2}\rangle-xy$
$x>y\vee(\sqrt{2}-1)$ A-R $x$ , $\overline{x}$
The inning probabilities for the players and the probability of draw are
P(draw) $= \frac{1}{4}(17-12\sqrt{2})\approx 0.00736$,
$P(W_{1})=F(W_{2})= \frac{1}{2}$ {1-P(draw)} $= \frac{1}{8}(12\sqrt{2}-13)$ $\approx 0.49632$ .
(See Figure le.)
Proof. For the bimatrix $\mathrm{M}(x, y|x\leq y)$ we note that
$\mathrm{z}^{(1-y^{2})}1>(<)y$ , if $y$ $<(>)\sqrt{2}-1$
$\mathrm{z}^{(1+y^{2})-xy}1$ $>(<)y$ , if $y<(>)1+x-\sqrt{2x+x^{d}}$
.
$\equiv k$ $\langle x)$ , say.
And $k(x)$ is convex, decreasing with $k(0)=1$ , $k(\sqrt{2}-1)$ $=\sqrt{2}-$ $1$ , and $k$(1) $=2$ – $\sqrt{3}\approx$ 0.268.
So, for the bimatrix $\mathrm{M}(x,y|x>y)$ , we evidently have
$\frac{1}{2}(1 -x^{2})>(<)x$ , if $x<(>)\sqrt{2}-1$
$\mathrm{z}^{(1+x^{2})-xy>(<)}1x$ , if $x<(>)1+y-\sqrt{2y+y^{2}}=k(y)$ .
Therefore, by combining the above facts about $\mathrm{M}(x,y)$ , we get the table in the theorem.
The probabilities we want to find are
$P(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{w})$ $=$
$\int_{0}^{\sqrt{2}-1}\int_{0}^{\sqrt{2}-1}h_{RR}dxdy=\int_{0}^{\sqrt{2}-1}\int_{0}^{\sqrt{2}-1}$ xydxdy $= \frac{1}{4}(\sqrt{2}-1)^{4}=\frac{1}{4}(17-12\sqrt{2})$ ,
$P(W_{1})= \int_{0<x<y<}\int_{\sqrt-1}\{\frac{1}{2}(1+y^{2})-xy\}dxdy+\int_{0<y<\not\subset<}\int_{\sqrt{2}-1}\frac{1}{2}(1-x^{2})dxdy+\int_{\sqrt-1}^{1}x^{2}dx+\int_{\sqrt-1}^{1}y\overline{y}dy$
$=$ $\frac{1}{8}(4\sqrt{2}-5)$ I $\sqrt{2}-1=\frac{1}{8}(12\sqrt{2}-13)$
and
1SO
$P(W_{2})=1-P(W_{1})-P( \mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{w})=1-\frac{1}{8}(12\sqrt{2}-13)$ $- \frac{1}{4}(17-12\sqrt{2})=\frac{1}{8}(12\sqrt{2}-13)$.
The result $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{W}\{)=P(W_{2})$ is consistent with our common sence. 0
$7$ . $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{A}n}\backslash \not\subset$ $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{R}\overline{\mathrm{f}}S\mathrm{k}y\iota,\mathrm{E}*4\mathfrak{n}$ $\#\iota r^{\iota_{l}}$ $l\mathrm{t}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{b}$ $1^{l\mathrm{t}1-\dot{I}}\downarrow$ $\zeta\tilde{\mathrm{a}}\not\in)$
$\mathit{9}$ . $\mathrm{C}_{\theta\nu 4\oint 4t!\}bn}.\mathrm{b}_{\{\dagger\mu_{\mathrm{L}Bn}^{\mathrm{y}}}\mathrm{R}eq.\gamma p_{h\mathrm{t}\mathit{5}}1\sim$ $\mathcal{B}_{\backslash }$
Figure 1. Optimal choice pairs in GKE and GRE.
(a) Th.l (b) Th.2 (c) Th.3A
$\mathrm{z}$
$\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{A}\mathrm{R}- \mathrm{R}$ gA-RA-A $\frac{1}{2}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{1}\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{R}\mathrm{R}- \mathrm{A}\Sigma \mathrm{A}-\mathrm{R}$ 51 $.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot.’.\mathrm{R}\dot{-}.\mathrm{A}\dot{\mathrm{R}}.-\cdot.\mathrm{R}’\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot \mathrm{i}’.‘ \mathrm{A}-\mathrm{R}a’_{!}\iota_{!}\mathrm{I}|\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{A}$
GKE, $\mathrm{I}^{10-01}$ GKE, $\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$ GKE, $\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$
$g=\mathrm{z}(1\sqrt{5}-1)\approx$ O.elSOS $a^{*}=\sqrt{3/8}\approx$ 0.6124
$V_{1}=V_{2}= \frac{1}{2}$ $V_{1}=V_{2}= \frac{1}{2}$ $\backslash V_{1}=\frac{1}{3}+\frac{1}{4}\sqrt{\frac{3}{8}}\approx$ 0.4864












(d) Th.4 (f) $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}.6\mathrm{A}$
$a^{*}21$
$\mathrm{R}- \mathrm{A}\mathrm{R}- \mathrm{R}$ $\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}-\mathrm{A}$
$\sqrt{2}-1\frac{1}{2}.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot.\cdot\cdot\cdot.\cdot.\cdot\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{\mathrm{A}- \mathrm{R}}\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{R}\ell_{\mathrm{R}-\mathrm{R}}\mathrm{R}.- \mathrm{A}$
. $\overline{a}^{*\mathit{1}}.-^{t}$ $\sqrt{2}-1$








(Curve is $y$ $=\overline{x}^{2}/(2x)$ )
R-A A-A
R-R A-R
We abserve that (1) The decision thresho ld in GRE in each infozation .type is smaller than
that in GKE. (2) There doesn’t exsit the optimal A-A pair under $\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$ ; and (3) In each of GKE
and GRE under $\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$ , the border of the optimal A and $\mathrm{R}$ regions for II is more complicate than
theose under $\mathrm{I}^{10-01}$ a $\mathrm{d}$ $\mathrm{I}^{11-11}$ . And, we find that $P(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{w})>0$ and $\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{W}\mathrm{i})<\mathrm{P}(\mathrm{W}2)$
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9 More about Games under Information $\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$ .
Under information $\mathrm{I}^{10-11}$ , player I has an advantage over player I. It would seem natural that
I would randomize his decision threshold in order to improve his disadvantage due to the leakage
of his “hand” to his opponent. The situation is like in poker. See, for example, Ref.[2 ; Section 6].
Standing at this viewpoint, the next
Assumption B. Player $I$, in state $X_{1}=x$ , chooses $R$ if $x<\overline{a}$, chooses $A$ if $x>a$ ased employs the
mixed strategy ($R$, $A$ ; $\frac{a-x}{a-\overline{a}}$ . $\frac{x-\overline{a}}{a-\overline{a}}$), if $\overline{a}<x<a$, for sorne $a \in[\frac{1}{2},1]$ which he must determine
beforehand,
instead of Assumption A (stated in Section 4), is worth studying.
The best choice of $a$ is not yet derived. Next two theorems show that the two extremes $a= \frac{1}{2}$
and $a=1$ belong to the worst choices for I.
Theorem 3B. Solution to GKE under info rmation $\mathrm{I}^{1\mathrm{b}11}$ and Assumption B.
(i). Case $a= \frac{1}{2}$ .
The .optimal strategy for $II$ in state $(y|x)1$ is $\mathrm{i}$
Choose A (R), if $x< \frac{1}{2,1’}$ and $y>(<)\overline{2}^{P}$
Choose A(R), if $x>\overline{2}$ and $y>(<)x_{f}$
The winning probabilities are
$P(W_{1})=1-P(W_{2})= \frac{23}{48}\approx 0.4792$.
(\"u). Case $a=1$ .
Players ’ optimal strategy-pairs and winning probabilities for $II$ are as shown in Figure 2. We
obtain
(9.1) $P(W_{2})=1-P(W_{1})= \frac{1}{6}+\frac{16}{81}+(-\frac{13}{1296}+\frac{1}{2}\log\frac{3}{2})\approx 0.5569$.
Case a $=1$




Mix. means I’s mixed strategy $(R,A;\overline{x},x)$ . The curve is $\xi(x)=\frac{3}{2}+x-\overline{x}^{-1}$ . $)$
II’s winning prob. are mentioned therewith.
10 Final Remark.
Three-player games under various infomation are of interest. GKE under
$\mathrm{I}^{100-010-001}$ and
$\mathrm{I}^{100-110-111}$ are solved in Ref.[4 $\cdot$, Theo.$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}3$] and Ref.[4 ; Theooem 2], respectively. GEE under
$\mathrm{I}^{100-010-001}$ is solved in Ref.[6; Theorem 1] (The meaning of the information types in three-player
games will be understood by referring to those in two-player games mentioned in Section 1). Several
games, $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}$)$\mathrm{r}$ example, GKE and GRE both under $\mathrm{I}^{111-111-111}$ remain to be solved.
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